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Hubungan Antara Corporate Governance dan Variabel Pengurang Masalah Agensi

2. On-line Journal of Universitas Islam Indonesia

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Title Hubungan Antara Corporate Governance dan Variabel Pengurang Masalah Agensi
 
Creator Zaenal Arifin
 
Description Most of the Indonesian listed companies have a single majority owner who has authority to elect the managers. So, there will be no conflict of interest between managers and the majority owners. In this situation, the conflict of interest may come out between the majority owners and the minority owners. The mechanisms that effectively to reduce the agency problem between managers and owners may be not always effective to reduce the agency problem between the majority owners and the minority owners. Some mechanisms that are expected to be effective in reducing the agency problem between the majority owners and the minority owners, especially in the Indonesian case, are the bonding mechanisms to reduce the free cash flows by increasing the dividend payment or increasing the debt. The other effective mechanism is monitoring conducted by an independent board of director. The main objective of this research is to investigate whether there are a significant relationship between corporate governance and agency-problem-reducing variables. The corporate governance is concern on all stakeholders’ interest while the agency variables are concern on one of the most important stakeholders’, that is the stockholders- interest. Theoretically, there should be a significant relationship between the corporate governance and the agency-problem-reducing variables. Using 52 Indonesian listed companies in 2001 that had been investigated by Indonesian Institute for Corporate Governance (IICG) for the companies’ practice of corporate governance and presented on SWA Magazine, this research found that no relationship between the corporate governance and the agency-problem-reducing variables. There are some possible explanations for this finding. First, reducing agency problems does not perceived (by investor) affecting the companies’ practice of corporate governance. Second, the bonding mechanisms to reduce the free cash flows by increasing the dividend payment or increasing the debt and monitoring by the independent board of directors are not an effective mechanism to reduce agency problems. So these mechanisms do not correlate to the companies’ practice of corporate governance. Third, the score of corporate governance released by IICG are not valid. Further investigations are needed to find the true explanation.keyword : Corporate Governance, Masalah Agensi
 
Publisher Jurnal Fenomena
 
Contributor
 
Date 2009-08-26
 
Type Peer-reviewed Article
 
Identifier http://journal.uii.ac.id/index.php/Fenomena/article/view/1137
 
Source Jurnal Fenomena; Vol 3, No 2 (2005)
 
Language en